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This paper presents a dynamic international trade model based on monopolistic 
competition, where observed intra-industry differences at a given point in time reflect 
different stages of the firm’s life cycle. New product varieties of still higher quality enter 
the market every period rendering old varieties obsolescent in a process of creative 
destruction. For given technology (variety) production costs decrease after an infant 
period due to learning. It is shown that several patterns of exports may arise depending 
primarily on the size of fixed trade costs. At a given point in time firms therefore differ 
due to different age, although all firms are symmetric in a life cycle perspective. The 
paper thus offers an alternative view on firm heterogeneity compared with other recent 
papers, where productivity differences appear as an outcome of a stochastic process.    
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The distinctive feature of the ‘new-new’ trade theory is different productivities for firms 
within the same industry, and due to such differences firms differ with respect to size, 
profitability and export orientation. This offshoot of international trade theory is 
developed in the seminal paper by Melitz (2003), but essential contributions are also 
found in several other recent papers (e.g. Schmitt and Yu, 2001; Montagna, 2001; 
Helpman et al., 2004). The theoretical framework in these papers is monopolistic 
competition based on a ‘love of variety’ specification of preferences as suggested by 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Dixit-Stiglitz preferences have previously been used for 
explaining intra-industry foreign trade by Krugman (1979b, 1980). However, in 
Krugman’s analyses firms were homogenous, so all firms are exporters and earn zero 
profits due to free entry and exit. By introducing differences of productivities, the recent 
literature in the Melitz tradition thus appears to be a generalized version of the Krugman 
model.  
 
In the Melitz (2003) model the differences of productivities follow from the outcome of a 
lottery process, which all producers have to go through. Before a prospective entrant 
starts to produce his productivity is uncertain. The productivity is first revealed for the 
producer after he has paid sunk costs in form of fixed entrance costs. All producers are 
identical, but only prior to entry as their productivity parameter is drawn from a common 
distribution. Afterwards, the productivities differ due to the actual outcomes of the 
individual producer’s participation in the productivity lottery. The productivity is thus 
exogenous given and time invariant, when the outcome of the lottery has been revealed. 
This formulation of productivity heterogeneity captures what most perceive as twin facts, 
namely that producers have different abilities to manage a company, but these abilities 
are to some extent unknown before actual management is exercised. Management or 
entrepreneurship is in other words elusive, which only reveals itself through practicing.  
 
However, analyses in the Melitz tradition disregard essential dynamic technological 
processes related both to product innovations, where new products of higher quality drive 
out older products, and process innovations, where existing products of given qualities 
are produced at lower costs. Firm heterogeneity observed at a given point in time may 
therefore reflect different stages of individual firms in their life cycle and not necessarily 
outcomes of a lottery, where some producers are lucky and others less so.  
 
The life cycle view of firm’s internationalization has been stressed by Vernon (1966) in 
his product life cycle theory, and later formalized by Krugman (1979a). Both relate the 
issue to a North-South perspective, where production is shifted from North to South as 
techniques of production becomes more standardized. An evolutionary perspective is also 
stressed in the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson and Valne, 1977, 1990; 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), where firms also follow different stages in their 
internationalization, and where decisions to export are made incrementally due to market 
uncertainty. Finally, the business literature has in recent years presented examples of new 
types of internationalization, where some firms – the so called ‘born globals’ - orient 
themselves to the world market from the beginning of their life cycle, while others are  3
only active on the domestic market (see e.g. Jolly et al., 1992; Lindqvist, 1991; Oviatt et 
al.; Rennie, 1993). Such mixed patterns of internationalization has been confirmed 
empirically, both in the business literature through case studies, but also recently by e.g. 
Bernard and Jensen (2004), who present evidence from the US showing that the export 
behavior of an individual firm vary from period to period. Their results show that on 
average 10% exit, while 14% of the firms enter the export market per year. Such 
differences in export behavior may, as shown in our paper, be related to the life cycle of 
the firm.  
 
The aim of this paper is to present a simple model, where differences of productivity, 
profitability and export behavior of firms at a given point in time reflect different layers 
of innovations and experiences due to different ages of the firms. The model describes 
equilibrium on a market with monopolistic competition. The preferences are of the ‘love 
of variety’ type, but generalized to include both horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation (varieties of the same and different qualities respectively). The flavor of 
the model follows from two crucial assumptions, both related to the dynamics of 
technology.  
 
First, it is assumed that every period offers a number of inventions or designs of product 
varieties of higher quality compared with designs from previous periods. Inventions are 
turned to actual innovations materialized through entry of new producers. This reduces 
operating profits of producing old varieties and ultimately, when operating profits 
become insufficient to cover the fixed production costs, production of these varieties 
ceases due to obsolescence. Better varieties thus steadily drive out varieties of lower 
quality in a process of ‘creative destruction’, as originally stressed by Schumpeter (1942). 
In the last decade several growth models include this mechanism, see e.g. Aghion and 
Howitt (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Aghion et al. (2001). 
 
Secondly, we assume that process innovations also take place. Through learning marginal 
costs of producing a specific variety may be reduced. The learning is assumed to be firm 
specific, i.e. we neglect learning across varieties. This assumption has been supported 
among others by Benkard (2000), who investigates organizational forgetting in the 
aircraft industry and shows that firm’s production experience depreciates over time in a 
process with incomplete spillovers of production expertise from one generation of aircraft 
to the next. We also assume that the productivity gain from learning is limited as 
experiences relate to a specific technology, i.e. production of a specific variety, and 
hence, after an initial period of learning the potential for further productivity gains are 
depleted. This idea of a limited potential for productivity gain from learning linked to a 
specific technology is also found in some contributions to the theory of economic growth, 
see e.g. Brezis et al. (1993).  
 
To keep the formal analysis simple we analyze the case, where each variety is produced 
in three periods only, which we term: the infant, the mature, and the aged period. In the 
infant period the varieties are of the highest quality on the market, but marginal costs are 
relatively high due to lack of experiences. In the mature period the varieties are not the 
most advanced varieties on the market, but marginal costs are relatively low due to  4
learning from production in the infant period. In the aged period the varieties are close to 
be outdated, but still produced due to low marginal costs. The three period’s analysis 
allows us to analyze several export patterns of firms found in the empirical literature. 
Sunk costs constrain the inflow of new varieties and fixed costs ensure a flow of exits of 
old varieties. In an open economy fixed trade costs may postpone entry, but precipitate 
exit from the export market, i.e. varieties may only be exported in the mature period.  
 
The model predicts at a given point in time an intra-industry structure broadly similar to 
the structure described in the Melitz (2003) model. However, all firms are symmetric in a 
life-cycle perspective, so we need not include a lottery process explaining productivity 
differences. In more general models, the life-cycle aspect of our model, as well as the 
mechanism in the Melitz model may both be included, so the two approaches appear to 
be complementary. While the Melitz model illustrates intra-industry trade in horizontally 
differentiated varieties, the life-cycle approach allows for intra-industry trade in both 
horizontally and vertically differentiated varieties. As shown in the model trade 
liberalization may influence not only the total number of varieties offered for the 
consumers, but also the composition between new high quality varieties and older 
varieties of lower quality. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and analyzes 
market equilibrium in a closed economy. Section 3 introduces a foreign country which 
allows for intra-industry trade although exporting firms incur variable and fixed trade 
costs for exporting to the foreign country. The section describes market equilibrium and 
identifies the group of exporting firms. Section 4 discusses the results derived in Section 
3. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix A derives operating profits relevant for the firms’ 
decision on exit from both the domestic and foreign market or from the foreign market 
exclusively. The results are used to describe the constraints of the parameters, which 
make the market equilibrium feasible.  
 
 
2. The basic model for a closed economy 
 
Assumptions 
This section develops a dynamic one-sector model for a closed economy characterized by 
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition based on a love of variety 
specification of preferences. Each period adds a new generation of a large number of 
varieties to the total supply of varieties on the market.  Each of these varieties enters 
symmetrically in demand, when compared with other varieties of the same generation. 
Between generations varieties differ in quality, so varieties from the most recent 
generation are of better quality than varieties from the preceding periods. Varieties of a 
certain age are thus becoming obsolete and not produced any longer, so only varieties 
from a limited number of generations are actually produced on the market.  
 
To simplify, we analyze the case, where only three generations of product varieties are 
produced. Varieties introduced in the present period indexed by 1 are in the infant period; 
varieties introduced one period ago indexed by 2 are in the mature period, and finally,  5
varieties introduced two periods ago indexed by 3 are in the aged period. Older varieties 
are not produced due to obsolescence which materializes when fixed production costs 
cannot be recovered any longer by potential operating profit. We do not claim specific 
realism for this three period assumption, which constrains the value of the parameters, 
but only that it allows for a simple analysis of interesting cases with respect to 
productivities, firm size and export behavior.  
 
A representative consumer’s preferences in the present period for varieties from the three 
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U stands for utility and ci,1, ci,2, and ci,3 indicate an individual’s consumption of variety i 
from generation  1, 2 and 3, respectively. ϕ  is a parameter describing the effect of quality 
improvements on utility, and n1,  n2,  n3 the number of varieties of each of the three 
generations
1. The consumers have also a latent demand for unproduced varieties with 
preferences similar to (1).    
 
The consumer’s behavior is defined by: 
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where the common wage rate is normalized to one.; pi,1, pi,2, pi,3 is the present prices for 
varieties introduced in the present period, and one and two periods ago, respectively.    
 
Each firm produces one variety only and the concept ‘firm’ is therefore used synonymous 
with variety. All firms belonging to a given generation are symmetric, i.e. have the same 
cost function. The only factor of production is labour. The costs of producing the newest 
generation of varieties and that of earlier generations introduced one and two periods ago, 

















                       (3) 
S is sunk costs, which all firms pay prior to entry, f is the (recurrent) fixed costs and x 
output. Marginal production costs in the infant period are β, but for the remaining periods 
at the lower level β/μ. This decrease of marginal costs represents a very simple 
specification of a learning effect, where the producer becomes fully experienced in 
producing his variety after one period.
2 Learning is thus related to the specific variety 
                                                 
1 The quality parameter is assumed to be constant.  Hallak (2006) suggests a more general specification as 
the parameter for the intensity of preference for quality, ϕ,  varies positively with real income.   
2 Firm specific learning from experience in an international (oligopolistic) trade setting has e.g. been 
formalized by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988).  6
with a limited potential, which is realized swiftly. Labor is inelastic supplied from a given 
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Output of the individual firm xij equals total demand for its variety Lcij, i.e: 
,, ;1 , 2 , 3 == ij ij xL cj           ( 5 )  
The firm maximizes its value Vi over its life-cycle. We disregard discounting between 
periods, and the firm’s value is thus given by:  
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where operating profit πi,j is given by: 
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and: 
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The value of the firm is driven to zero due to free entry and exit, and symmetry over the 
life cycle, i.e.:  
0 = i V                                  (8) 
 
Market equilibrium 
In the following we describe market equilibrium, and specify the constraint of the 
parameters for obsolescence after producing in three periods only. First, we determine 
prices, output and operating profits for firms of different ages using the standard 
procedure for deriving the equilibriums conditions for models of this type (see Krugman, 
1979b, 1980). All consumers are identical. The first order condition of the individual 
consumer’s utility maximization gives the (inverse) market demand functions of product 
varieties introduced in current and earlier periods:  
3
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where λ is the shadow price of the budget constraint, i.e. marginal utility of money.  
 
The large number of producers ensures a constant elasticity of market demand at 
1( 1 ) θ −− . Maximizing operating profits, the firms charge a price equal to a mark-up of 
marginal cost with the mark-up factor 1/θ, i.e.: 
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Firms of a given age all produce the same output, therefore we hereafter drop the notation 
i, i.e. ∀ i,j,  xi,j = xj, ci,j = cj, pi,j = pj  for  j=1,2,3. 
 
The output structure or relative output of each firm during its life cycle depends only on 
the parameters µ and ϕ. From (5), (9) and (10) we have: 
1
1
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This factorizes the development over time of production into two effects:  
a)  a positive effect on production of a decrease of marginal costs (µ) due to 
learning by doing,  which stimulates production of old-kind varieties in latter 
periods,  
 
b)  a negative effect on production of lower quality of older varieties (ϕ
1-j), 
because consumers increasingly turn their demand to the more recent introduced 
varieties of higher quality.  
 
Output is lower in the aged period compared with the mature period, as no further 
decrease of marginal costs takes place, i.e. x3<x2. The rank of output in the mature period 
compared with the infant period is ambiguous as  21 for . ϕ μ ><
<> xx Hence, at a given point 
in time firm size differs. 
 
Having determined relative output in the various stages of the firms life cycle we still 
miss to determine the absolute level of output. This follows from the zero value condition 
(8). 
 
Inserting (7), (8), (10) and (11) into (6) gives: 
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Using (12) together with (11) gives the full solution for output in each period of the 
firm’s life cycle. Finally, we calculate operating profit in each periods of the life cycle by 
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Operating profit is thus lower in the aged period compared with the mature period, while 
the rank of profit between the mature period and the infant period is ambiguous, as 
21 for .
θ π πϕ μ ><
<>  
 
Finally, the model determines the number of firms in each generation in equilibrium. The 
resource constraint follows from (3) and (4), i.e.:   
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Transforming the consumer’s budget constraint to the aggregate level by multiplying the 
individual consumer’s budget constraint with the total number of consumers L and 
inserting the equilibrium prices (10) gives: 
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Combining (14a) and (14b) gives 
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As shown in Appendix B closer inspection of the budget and resource constraint in 
equilibrium shows that the number of entries each period is constant, i.e.  123 ˆ === nnnn . 
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Till now we have just assumed that all product varieties become obsolete after having 
been produced in just three periods. This constrains the values of the parameters. A life 
cycle of three periods will only exist if the individual producer neither has an incentive to 
produce his variety for a fourth period nor to cease production of the variety after two 
periods only. This is the case if operating profits can cover fixed costs in the third period, 
but not for the subsequent fourth period, i.e: 
43 π π << % f                 (16) 
where ‘tilde’ indicates the potential value of the variable. Operating profit  3 π is given by 





















Noticing that ∂M/∂μ<0, while ∂M/∂ϕ >0, both the left-hand side and the right-hand side 
of (17) varies positively with S and μ, but negatively with f and ϕ . High entry costs make 
it more likely that the left hand side of (17) is violated, so the producer has an incentive 
to produce in a fourth period. The reason is that the high entry costs increases the product 
runs and operating profits for producing a variety of a given age. Low entry costs bring 
the right-hand side of (17) into focus as small product runs make it more likely that the 
producer closes production in a third period. High fixed production costs make it more 
likely that the right hand side of (17) is violated. High fixed costs increases the product 
runs and operating profits, but the increase in operating profits are here less than the 
increase of fixed costs, so production may be closed already after a second period. The 
opposite effect follows from small fixed costs, which shifts focus to the left-hand side of 
(17). A high rate of growth of quality improvements or a small learning effect of a given 
variety may precipitate obsolescence, while a low rate of quality improvement or a large 
learning effect have the opposite effect. 












3. Open economy model 
 
This section generalizes the model above by supposing two symmetric countries, a home 
country and a foreign country. The two countries’ resource endowment (labour force), 
preferences and technologies are similar to the model just analyzed. Trade is possible, but 
the markets are only partially integrated due to fixed trade costs m≥  0 and variable 
iceberg trade costs specified by the parameter g (0<g<1), where (1-g) represents the share 
of output, which disappears as trade costs. We assume that trade costs are independent of 
the firm’s stage in its life cycle, i.e. we disregard that learning may take place in the 
export activity
3. Similar to the analysis in the previous section we assume that the 
parameters ensure the establishment of equilibrium with a three period life cycle.  
 
Even in this simplified three periods life cycle several configurations of export behavior 
are possible, see Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. Alternative types of export behavior for a firm with a life-cycle of three periods 
  Alternative types of export behavior 
Period I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Infant  period  +  +  - - +  - - 
Mature  period  + + + + -  -  - 
Aged  period  + -  + -  -  + - 
Note: + and – indicates export and no export respectively. 
It should be noticed that the values of the parameters should fulfill a specific constraint for the feasibility of 
each of the alternative types of export behavior. 
                                                 
3 In his review over the empirical literature on the relation between exports and productivity Wagner (2007) 
states that evidence on learning-by-exporting is somewhat mixed. 
Operating profit 
                    πj 
Fixed 
costs     f 
Periods 
j 
  1          2          3          4          5          6 11
The love of variety preferences (with a constant elasticity) ensures that the foreign 
product always will be demanded irrespective the size of variable trade costs. However, a 
foreign variety is only supplied when the fixed trade costs can be covered, i.e. operating 
profit for exports should at least be equal to fixed trade costs. If variable and fixed trade 
costs are very high, exports may be unprofitable in all stages of the firm’s life as 
indicated by case VII in Figure 2, i.e. both countries operate in this case as closed 
economies. In the opposite case, where variable and fixed trade costs are very low, firms 
export in all stages on their life cycles as indicated by the case I in Figure 2. Between 
those extreme cases the firm export in some, but not all periods as shown by the cases II 
to VI. However, case VI newer materializes as it is inferior to at least one of the other 
cases. If exports are loss-making for the firm in its mature period due to insufficient 
demand, the market will be even more meager in the aged period and hence, the fixed 
trade costs cannot be covered for that period. The feasible ‘mixed’ cases of exports in 
some, but not all periods, thus narrow into the four cases II to V.  
 
The procedure for solving the model in the various cases is similar. This section only 
looks at two cases. First, we analyze case I, where all firms act as ‘born globals’ and 
export throughout their life cycle, and next we look at case IV, where all firms only 
export in their mature period. Especially case IV is illustrative for firm heterogeneity due 
to different export behavior during a firm’s life cycle.   
 
Exports in all periods 
The consumers in each country are offered domestic and foreign varieties from all three 
generations of domestic and foreign firms as in the closed economy. The preferences are 
specified as in the closed economy by the utility function: 
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The other assumptions in the closed economy model are unchanged, with the exception 
that the producer in addition to production costs also incurs variable and fixed trade 
costs.
4   
 
The first-order condition for utility maximization gives the (inverse) demand functions:   
 
                                                 
4Additionally there may of course also be sunk market access costs. In such cases we broaden the 
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where 
*
, / ij p g is the price of foreign varieties paid by domestic consumers and hence, 
*
, ij p  
is the price the foreign producer obtains. Due to the symmetry 
*
, / ij p g also illustrates the 
price of domestic varieties paid by foreign consumers and 
*
, ij p  the price the domestic 
producer obtains for output to export. Using the assumed constant demand elasticity, the 
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Firms from the same generation face the same demand, costs, and prices. Hence, output is 
identical for all firms of the same age, and subscripts are therefore neglected in the 
following.  
 
The firms produce both to the domestic market x
d
j and the foreign market x
f
j, i.e. total 
output is given by: 
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To meet demand on the domestic market the firm produces Lcj. To meet demand on the 
foreign market Lc*j the firm has to produce Lc*j/g, as a part of the output ‘melts’ away 
due to trade costs. Hence 
*
and
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Using (20) and (21) in (23) to calculate output produced for export relative to output 
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and hence, total output given by (22): 
  13
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Using (20) and (21) once more gives the following expressions for the structure of total 
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which is identical with the output structure for the closed economy. 
 
The zero value condition allows us to determine the absolute levels of output. Inserting 
(7), (8), (21) and (26) into (6) (generalized with fixed trade costs) gives: 
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The full solution for output in each period of the firms’ life cycle follows from (26) and 
(27). Although output in relative terms is the same as in the closed economy (see (11)) 
output in absolute terms is larger in case of trade. The reason is that the producers should 
earn more operating profit to be able to cover fixed trade costs.    
Having solved for the absolute value of output in the infant period, the absolute level of 
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Finally, the number of firms in equilibrium is derived by using the same procedure as for 
the closed economy or just by inserting the results for output, (26) and (27), in the full 
employment condition (14a) (expanded with fixed trade costs), and restricting 
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Comparing (29) with (15) shows that the number of firms in each country in the open 
economy is less than in the closed economy, while output of each firm as previously 
shown is larger. However, it should be noticed that the consumers in the open economy 
case have access both to domestic and foreign varieties.  
The restrictions on the values of the parameters for the existence of the described 
equilibrium is more complex compared with the case of a closed economy. The reason is 
that the firm has the option to exit partially by leaving the export marked, while still 
producing to the domestic market. To analyze this we dissolve total operating profits πj 
into its two components, operating profit on the domestic market π
d
j, and operating profit 
on the export market π
f
j , i.e.: 
() ; 1 , 2 , 3 ππ π =+ =
df
jj j j          (30) 
To ensure that all producers produce in a three period life cycle, each producer should 
have an incentive to produce in the third period, while no producer should have an 
incentive to produce in a fourth period, neither to both markets nor to the domestic 
market only. This gives the conditions:  
43 () π π <+< % fm           ( 3 1 )  
and 
4 π < %
d f           ( 3 2 )  
Morover, for exporting in all three periods operating profit from exports in each period π
f
j 
(j= 1,2,3) should exceed the fixed trade costs m. Operating profit for exporting in the 
mature period is always larger than operating profit for exporting in the aged period, so 
the binding condition for exporting in all three periods reduces to:  
13 ., ππ>
ff Min m           (33) 
Operating profit π3 is given by (28), and potential operating profit for producing and 
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where M
I is equal to M for the closed economy. 
  15
(34) is broadly identical with the condition for a three period life cycle for a closed 
economy given by (17), apart from the additional fixed trade costs, which in case of left-
hand side of (34) is not fulfilled induce the producer to exit after two periods only.  
 
The Appendix A also reports potential operating profit 4 π %
d for producing to the domestic 
market exclusively in a fourth period, see (A3). Inserting this expression for  4 π %
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If the first parenthesis is less than 1, the left hand side condition of (34) is reproduced and 
no incentive exists for producing both to the domestic and foreign market in a fourth 
period. If the second parentheses also is less than 1, (35) is fulfilled and no incentive 
exists for producing in a fourth period for the domestic market exclusively. Small trade 
costs (low values of m/f and values of g close to 1) may ensure this condition. 
 
Using (A4) and (A5) from Appendix A shows that
2
13 for
θ π πμ ϕ ≥<
<≥
ff , i.e. operating 
profit on the export market is smallest in the first period, if learning is strong and quality 
growth small, and vice versa in the opposite case. 
 


















⎜⎟ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ++ ++ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ > ⎜⎟






      ( 3 6 )  
 
To satisfy (36) variable and fixed trade costs should be relatively low. 
 
To conclude on case I, the firm experiences different productivities and market positions 
of its products during its life cycle. This impacts its output as well as its export behaviour. 
The export orientation, i.e. export to output, is the same in all three periods, where the 
firm produces. The assumed constant parameter for iceberg trade costs is main 
responsible for this structural constancy. If the variable trade costs were sensitive to 
learning, i.e. the iceberg parameter increased after the infant period the firms would be 
more export oriented in late periods of their life compared with their infant period. 
However, even in case of constant trade costs during all periods of the firm’s life cycle 
substantial fixed trade costs may cause radical changes in firms export orientation during 
its life-cycle. In the following we analyze this more carefully.   
  16
Exports only in the mature period 
For some values of the parameters market equilibrium exist, where the life cycle make up 
three periods, but the firms are only export active in their mature period (case IV in 
Figure 2). As in the analysis above we first describe the structure of the market 
equilibrium and then the preconditions for this specific equilibrium.  
 
The market is provided by domestically produced varieties from all three periods, but 
only foreign varieties from the mature period. Disregarding the terms in the utility 
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The cost functions are similar to the previous case although trade costs only are relevant 
in the mature period. Due to symmetry for firms of same age we only indicate age by 
subscript.    
 
Using (20), (21), (22) and (23), and keeping in mind that the firm is only export active in 
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     (39) 
Using the zero value condition (7) for determination of output in the infant period, x1,  i.e. 
inserting (7), (8), (20) and (39) into (6) (generalized with fixed trade costs in the mature 
period only) gives:  
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Inserting the results for prices and output given by (21), (39) and (40) into the 
















































     ( 4 1 )  
 
Finally, the number of firms in steady state equilibrium follows from inserting output, 
(39) and (40), in the full employment condition (14) (expanded by fixed trade costs for 







          ( 4 2 )  
 
Given that firms only export in the mature period and only incur one set of fixed trade 
costs, the number of firms are higher relative to the case with ‘born globals’ (compare 
(42) with (29)). 
 
The described equilibrium imposes restrictions on the values of the parameters. To ensure 
production in a third, but not a fourth period, the following conditions should hold: 
  
44 33 π ππ π %%
dd =< f < =         (43) 
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Furthermore, to ensure export in the mature period, but not in the infant and aged period, 
the conditions are:  
 
13 . ππ< %%
ff Max , m          ( 4 4 )  
and 
2 π >
f m           ( 4 5 )  
 
To specify the constraints of the parameters explicitly, we use (41), and (A6) from 
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The constraint on the parameters for producing in a three period life cycle is very similar 
to the previous case; see (17) and (34). The constraint illustrates specifically that low 
variable trade costs (g close to 1) reduces operating profit due to lower product runs, and 
in case that the right-hand side of (46) is not fulfilled the producer will exit after two 
periods only 
 
Inserting (A7) and (A8) from the Appendix A in (44) gives the constraint for non-export 
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> %% % %
ff f f , i.e. the binding constraint is non-
export in the first period, if learning is low and quality growth large, while the binding 
constraint is non-export in the third period for the opposite situation. High variable and 
fixed trade costs lower operating profits for exporting, and high trade costs thus ensures 
(47). 
 
For analyzing the constraint for exporting in the second period, we insert (A9) from the 
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This constraint may be fulfilled for relatively low fixed and variable trade costs. Hence 
comparing (47) and (48), fixed and variable trade costs should therefore neither be very 
low nor very small to ensure that export activity only takes place in the second period. 
 
 
4. Export orientation, intra-industry trade and welfare 
 
In an international trade perspective with variable and fixed trade costs the model opens 
up for different export patterns, all depending on the value of the parameters of the 
model: The rate of product innovation; the degree of learning; variable and fixed trade 
costs; and sunk (entry costs). The export pattern may be ‘born globals’, where firms 
export over their whole life; or it may be a later expansion into export markets like in the 
Uppsala model, or it may be export in just some intermediate periods of firms life cycles. 
All these different export patterns have been observed in the business literature through 
case studies and /or in empirical trade studies. 
 
The presented model has intra-industry trade (IIT), and since it operates with both 
horizontal and vertical product differentiation, intra-industry trade may involve both IIT 
in horizontally and vertically differentiated products. In case of ‘born global’s’, we have 
IIT at all levels of product qualities, so measured IIT, using e.g. the traditional Grubel-
Lloyd index (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975), will involve a mix of IIT in horizontally and 
vertically differentiated goods. If we on the other hand have trade in mature varieties 
only, the IIT is purely in horizontally differentiated products. Which type of IIT that will 
arise is thus sensitive to the parameters in the model. 
 
Concerning the welfare implications of market opening we find the supply of product 
varieties increases like previous models, e.g. Krugman (1979b, 1980, but which 
generations of foreign varieties consumers get access to depends on the parameters of the 
model: In a ‘born global’ framework consumers get access to all foreign varieties, but in 
other situations, they only get access to a selection of foreign varieties and not necessarily 
the newest. Trade opening reduces the number of domestic varieties and if we only have 
trade in mature varieties the consumers may face a reduced number of the most advanced 
varieties although the total number of varieties available for the consumers has increased. 
 
Trade liberalization through a small reduction of the variable and/or fixed export costs 
impacts the market equilibrium incrementally, if the feasibility conditions for the life 
cycle and export configuration still are fulfilled. If in contrast, the decrease of the trade 
costs violates feasibility conditions, the market equilibrium changes radically as the firms 
change their strategy on export behavior and/or length of their life cycle. When such 
profound changes of market equilibrium take place, the number of varieties available for 
consumers jumps and so does the age structure and social welfare.   20
5. Conclusion 
 
The above presented model shares important characteristics with previous models of the 
‘new-new’ trade theory, but differs also in other important respects. Firm heterogeneity is 
the common feature, but two alternative stories are told in explaining the reasons for such 
differences. In previous models of the ‘new-new’ trade theory, e.g. the model of Melitz 
(2003), the individual firm’s productivity reflects a stochastic outcome of a ‘productivity 
lottery’ revealed, when the firm enters the market and later on, when the firm is under 
risk of negative productivity shocks, which ultimately may drive the firm out of business. 
The lucky firms born with high productivity are large; reap substantial profits and self 
select into the export marked.  
 
In the model developed above firms are characterized by being symmetric in a life cycle 
perspective. Firms start up with the newest product technology, but relatively high 
variable production costs, because of lack of experience in producing this specific 
variety. After an infant period the producer becomes more experienced and hence more 
cost efficient. However, an ongoing process of entry of competitors providing the market 
with more modern varieties influences demand for a producer’s variety negatively, and 
lastly the producer therefore exits du to obsolescence. These mechanisms give the 
distinctive nature of the model. At a given point in time observed differences between 
firms are ascribed to the different ages of the firms. Specifically, the export behavior may 
differ between generations of firms as each generation of firms are screened by the fixed 
trade costs for their incentive to export.  
 
The Melitz (2003) model illustrates that exposure to trade makes the more productive 
firms to enter export markets, while the least productivity firms exit the industry; so on 
average the productivity of the economy will increase. To put it differently, the more 
fierce competition in an open economy root out weak (low productivity) firms freeing the 
resources for more cost efficient firms. This illustrates an important source of welfare 
from trade liberalization. The same effect may also materialize in our model. The weak 
firms are here the old firms, which for a given age are equally efficient. Opening for trade 
may violate the feasibility conditions for the closed economy by rendering it unprofitable 
to produce in the full life cycle of the closed economy, and in such cases, where trade 
shortens the length of the life cycle, the efficiency of the population of firms and hence, 
welfare increases. 
 
The concept firm is used synonymous with variety in all models of the new-new trade 
theory. When age is the important factor for productivity and market position of the 
variety, this raises serious empirical challenges for testing the theory. Firm data are 
usually based on firms as legal units, which from time to time transform their activities 
from one variety to another more modern variety. This renders the age of the firm into 
irrelevance in analysis of the life cycle of a variety. For empirical testing more detailed 
data are therefore needed. 
 
The lottery approach and the life cycle approach thus broadly paint a similar picture of 
structural intra-industry differences. Larger differences exist, when it comes to policy  21
implications of the two approaches. A social ruler aiming to maximize welfare may 
manipulate with the entry process through (positive or negative) subsidies of the sunk 
costs. In models based on the lottery approach this means that more or less lottery tickets 
are bought, but the outcome, i.e. the group of entrants, is not on average more efficient 
than the existing population of firms. In contrast, stimulating entry in models based on 
the life cycle approach unambiguously leads to larger generations of more modern firms 
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Appendix A: Actual and potential operating profits relevant for the producer’s exit 
decisions 
 
1.  Closed economy 
The producer considers producing the variety in a fourth period on a market, where 
all competitors produce the variety in three periods. The potential profit for producing 
in a fourth period  4 π % follows from the optimization conditions for the consumer and 






































































       ( A 1 )  
 
2.  Open economy, case I 
Actual and potential operating profit are derived by using the consumer and producer 




























































































































































































































































































       ( A 5 )  
3.  Open economy, case IV 
Actual and potential operating profit are derived by the consumer and producer 





















































































































































































































































































        ( A 9 )  
 
It follows straight forwardly that operating profit by exporting decreases with fixed trade 
costs, but less than the increase of fixed trade costs. Lowering variable trade costs 
increases operating profit by exporting, i.e. operating profit by exporting varies positively 
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Appendix B. Proof of n1=n2=n3 
 
The resource constraint and the budget constraint at the aggregate level follow from (14a) 
and (14b), i.e.  
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Subtracting (B1) from (B2) gives: 
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simplifies (B3) to 
 
11 22 330 ∏ ∏∏ ++= nn n          (B5) 
 
Expressed in profits the zero value condition (6) is given by: 
 
123 0 ∏ ∏∏ ++=           (B6) 
 
The resource constraint is given by (14c), i.e. 
 
11 2 3 () ( 1 ) θ ++ + = − nS n n n f L        (B7) 
 
In a dynamic framework the equations (B5) and (B7) are second-order difference 
equations each describing the development of n over time. However, the two equations 
differ and hence, the described paths will also differ in general, i.e. without restrictions 
the solutions are inconsistent. The only consistent solution appears in the case where 
n1=n2=n3 as the difference equation (B5) here collapses due to the restriction (B6).  
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